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WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY
tiff alleges negligence on the part of defendant corporation in
knowingly permitting the floor of its store to remain in an unsafe
condition. Plaintiff seeks to show defendant's knowledge by means
of a statement, allegedly made by defendant's manager immediate-
ly after the accident, to the effect that someone else had fallen in
the same spot earlier that day. Held, that the statement of the
manager was not admissible as part of the res gestae because the
source of the manager's information was not shown. Reynolds v.
W. T. Grant Ca.'
As a rule hearsay is inadmissible for the reason that state-
ments, unsworn and not subject to cross-examination,2 are un-
trustworthy.' To this rule there are certain exceptions. In general,
these exceptions require that there be (1) a necessity for the ad-
mission of the hearsay -statement, and (2) some circumstantial
guarantee of trustworthiness. 4 The so-called res gestae exception'
possesses, in addition, the requirement that the hearsay declarant
must possess the ordinary qualifications of a witness in regard to
knowledge and the like.' This requirement is apparently so
generally recognized and accepted that it receives little attention
in discussions of exceptions to the hearsay rule.7 Probably for the
same reason - i.e., the obvious nature of the requirement -the
West Virginia court is, it appears, rarely called upon to enforce
the requirement' because in the instant case the court cites no
1186 S. E. 603 (W. Va. 1936). The court also refused to admit the alleged
statement as a declaration against interest, the refusal being based on the
ground that the statement was "... not shown to have been related to an
act being performed by him [declarantJ directly under his authority as agent.
2 See 3 WiGmmRE, EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1923) § 1365, discussing cross-examina-
tion and confrontation. Wigmore says of the latter that it is often referred
to as an additional test of statements offered testimonially but that in dis-
cussions of the hearsay rule "confrontation" may be taken as merely another
name for the opportunity of cross-examination.
3 3 WIGUoRE, EVIDENCE § 1362; 1 GREENLEAP, EVIDENCE (16th ed. 1899) §
114a.
4 3 WI MORE, EVIDENCE § 1420; 1 GREENLEAF, EVIDENCE § 114a.
5 See 3 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 1767, 1768, 1745-1757; see also Note (1918)
25 W. VA. L. Q. 341 discussing res gestate and "spontaneous exclamatians",
In the present case the court seems to treat res gestae and spontaneous ex-
clamations as synonymous.
6 3 WIGM0RE, EGIDENCE § 1424; 1 GTEFNLEA', EVIDENCE § 114a; see also 2
Wim0oE, EVIDENCE § 657 which, in discussing "knowledge" as a testimonial
qualification, says that what the witness represents as his knowledge must be
an impression derived from the exercise of his own senses and must be founded
on his personal observatiois.
7 See 3 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 1445, 1471, 1485, 1530, 1568, 1591, stating
the knowledge qualifications under various exceptions. See also ibid. § 1751 in
which Wigmore, discussing "spontaneous exclamations" says, "This re-
1
C.: vidence--Hearsay--Res Gestae Exception--Necessity That Declarant
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1936
RECENT CASE COMMENTS
West Virginia decision in support of its holding. However, the
court does cite four cases from other jurisdictions which, are
squarely in point and which set forth the requirement of the hear-
say declarant's knowledge qualifications in unequivocal terms.9
A closely analogous situation exists in the case of dying
declarations -another exception to the hearsay rule.1 The West
Virginia court has said that hearsay statements sought to be ad-
mitted under this exception must be such as would be admissible
if the declarant were in court testifying."' The requirement thus
laid down would seem to be applicable, by analogy, to the so-called
res gestae exception."
V. V. C.
MuN IcPAL CORPORATIONS - EXTRA-TERRITORIAL POWERS -
AUTHORITY TO BUnIu SEWAGE DISPosAL PLANT OUTSIDE THEM STATE.
-In a recent West Virginia case the Supreme Court of Appeals
held that a municipality had the power to acquire property and
erect a sewage disposal plant in an adjoining state. Bernard v. City
of Bluefield.'
The court cited as authority for its holding the only two
similar decisions2 among the few cases raising the problem of the
extra-territorial exercise of powers by municipalities outside the
state of their creation.
quirement [of knowledge qualificationsJ is in practice usually fulfilled ...
Nevertheless, in an appropriate case, it would without doubt be enforced.
... ." See Isa 1 GREENLEAP, EVIDENCE § 114a.
Woodrum Home Outfitting Co. v. Adams Express Co., 90 W. Va. 161, 165,
110 S. E. 549 (1922) appears to be a holding on the point.
9 Hines v. Patterson, 146 Ark. 367, 225 S. W. 642 (1920); Crawford v.
CharlestofA-Isle of Palms Traction Co., 126 S. C. 447, 120 S. E. 381 (1923);
Kumke v. Best Kid Co., 244 Pa. 126, 90 Ati. 538 (1914); Wenquist v. Omaha
& C. B. St. Ry. Co., 97 Neb. 554, 150 N. W. 637 (1914). Hines v. Patterson,
supra, is substantially similar to the principal case. The court held the state-
ment inadmissible as part of the res gestac because "There was no showing
that the bystander saw appellee faint or that he was present at the time of the
occurrence. For aught that appears, he may have received the information
.... from thers." Id. at 376.
20 See 3 WiGMORE, EVmENCE §§ 1430-1452.
11 See State v. Hood, 63 W. Va. 182, 185, 59 S. E. 971 (1907) ; State v. Bur-
nett, 47W . Va. 731, 737, 35 S. E. 983 (1900), wherein the rule is set forth in a
dictum cited in State v. Hood, supra. See also 3 WIGMOmE, EVMENCE § 1445;
4 ELLIOTT, EVIDENCE (1905) § 3033.
12 See n. 5.
1186 S. E. 298 (W. Va. 1936).
2 Langdon v. City of Walla Walla, 112 Wash. 4462 193 Pac. 1 (1920);
Superior Water, Light & Power Co. v. City of Superior, 174 Wis. 257, 181 N.
W. 113; id, 176 Wis. 627, 183 N. W. 254 (1922).
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